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Date Published: 01/26/10

STILL ON THE MARITIME SECURITY AGENCY BILL By Chigozie Chikere

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The dust raised by the Maritime Security Agency Bill is yet to settle. At moment, heated arguments involving major industry stakeholders are still going on. The issue at stake is that the Presidential Implementation Committee on Maritime Safety and Security (PICOMSS), set up to espouse Nigeria’s attainment of the International Maritime Organisation’s (IMO) recommendation for maritime security, is now being proposed as a permanent government agency to be known as the Maritime Security Agency. According to the bill, this new agency is expected to be responsible for the gathering and sharing of intelligence information among relevant security and maritime agencies in the country. 

According to the proponents of the bill, the audit report of the IMO in 2007 and of the US Coast Guard in 2008 recommends the gathering of actionable intelligence and the need to identify threats and responses on issues relating to maritime security. It was on this premise that PICOMSS was set up by the Federal Executive Council (FEC) in September 2003. Prior to September 2003, there was the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre in the United States of America (USA), which incident put international security organisations on their toes. In response, the IMO adopted the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, an aspect of the Safety Of Lives At Sea (SOLAS) Convention, to detect and deter security incidents involving Ships and Port facilities. Consequently, member countries were mandated to meet security specifications of the ISPS Code on or before July 1, 2004. It was the Federal Government’s subscription to this IMO recommendation that brought PICOMSS on board.  

Considering the ad hoc nature of PICOMSS at inception, it is supposed to have wound up by the time it completed its assignment in 2004. But for reasons best known to FEC, the Committee has continued to function and to draw funds from the organisations that initially financed its operations. Evidently, most of the areas the new bill seeks to address have been under the auspices of PICOMSS since 2003. It has been maintaining the requisite shoreside infrastructure for maritime surveillance and maritime domain awareness. In time, it was shifted from the Ministry of Transport to the office of the National Security Adviser (NSA) to assume its mandatory security role within the larger context of national security. 

Security issues, whether at local or international dimension, are usually evolutionary. Standards undergo periodic review as threats evolve. Recently, international terrorism has put untold pressure on sea and air transport to such an extent that new conventions that border on security have emerged. Security administration in the Nigerian maritime industry has always proved susceptible to these improvements. A few years ago, the former National Maritime Authority (NMA) was reformed to bring its functions at par to the dynamics of international shipping, thus bringing to birth the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA). It is pertinent to note here that at inception, NIMASA was, alongside the previous functions of NMA, vested with the responsibility of superintending the provision of security for maritime traffic and the Ports. Besides, the Nigerian Navy (NN) has the constitutional duty to secure and defend Nigeria’s territorial waters. Regarding the security of Ports facilities and cargo, the Nigerian Customs Service (NCS), the Nigerian Police (NP), the Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA) and other ancillary organisations are commissioned to carry the responsibility. It is obvious that there is no security if there is no surveillance and intelligence data, so there is no doubt that these security organisations are trained to carry out these sensitive functions and also to take on emergencies. 

In a recent study; Cargo Diversion from Nigerian Ports, by the Department of Transport Management Technology of the Federal University of Technology Owerri, the Researcher, Chikere (2008), found out that proliferation of security agencies at the ports is one the factors that contribute to cargo diversion from Nigerian ports. According to the study, at a time, the Nigerian Ports was under security siege as about 26 different organs or security agencies were working in each of the seaports in Nigeria.  Some of the security agencies were Directorate of Naval Intelligence (DNI), Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), Port Intelligence (PI), Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA), Standards Organization of Nigeria (SON), Nigeria Police (CID, FIIB, and Patrol Police), State Security Service (SSS), National Agency for Foods, Drugs Administration and Control (NAFDAC), and many others. In some cases one security outfit was having two or more different units all virtually doing the same job at different stages of cargo delivery.  The most striking fact is that while the security outfits were falling over one another at the seaports and extorting money from shipping companies, importers and their agents, the ports were not safer in any way. Ultimately miscreants made the ports their home. The study also identified high port charges as another factor that contributes to cargo diversion from Nigerian Ports. 

Since January 13, 2010, reactions from maritime watchers, experts and  practitioners have included the speculation that the establishment of the proposed Maritime Security Agency would usher in another tax regime with all kinds of levies imposed on Port users to the end of raising overall Port charges. Incidentally, at present, NIMASA operates a 3% levy on inbound freights and a 2% levy on outbound freights. This and other levies have impacted negatively on patronage of Nigerian Ports. One report has it that in 2009 alone, PICOMSS collected N1.8 billion from NIMASA, N3 billion from NPA and $200 million from the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). These, certainly are the organisations financing its operations presently. It is obvious that by the time it commences operation as a full-fledged non-revenue agency of government, its funding will be an additional load on Port users and another reason for Importers to continue to divert cargoes to neighbouring Ports and depriving the Nigerian Ports of patronage. 

Lack of patronage leads to capacity under-utilization and consequently, decay of infrastructure, as Akinsoye (1998), in his study, Capacity Utilization of Apapa and Tin-Can Island Ports, observed. According to him, the rate at which the various available capacities are utilized had deteriorated over time, and as such has created increased excess capacity. His work showed the mean rate of capacity utilization for Apapa port as 36.7% and 42.3% for Tin-Can Island Port. He, however, apportioned the blame partly to cargo diversion. Towing this line of argument, Stephens (2003), in his study, Port Utilization and Performance: A case study of the Lagos Port complex, Apapa Quays, (1990-1999) reported that capacity utilization in terms of tonnage handled had dwindled, to the tune of 25% as at 1999.  

Apart from the envisaged case of multiple taxation and the spiral effect it will have on Port operations in Nigeria, the creation of the Maritime Security Agency will swell the ranks of the controversies arising from the endless clashes between the various government agencies in the maritime industry. It would be recalled that in 2009, a bill for the creation of a National Transport Commission (NTC) was sponsored by the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Marine Transport, Senator Gbemisola Saraki, primarily to address cases of jurisdictional disputes arising between NIMASA and other regulatory agencies in the industry. From all indication, the Maritime Security Agency Bill is a replica of the NIMASA Act in all respect and as such seeks to erode the core functions of NIMASA. 

There is just one suggestion to the FEC on this issue. Dissolve PICOMMS and allow its functions to flow into the Intelligence and Surveillance arm of NIMASA. Where this department is non-existent in NIMASA, create one immediately and save the Nigerian maritime transport community from unnecessary muscle flexing. 

Chigozie Chikere

Traffic Data Analyst and Member, Chartered Institute of Logistics & Transport

7 Samuel Ladoke Akintola Boulevard, Garki II, Abuja

e-mail: grandefather@yahoo.com

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