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By Tracy Moses
In 2025, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) operated under the long shadow of the 2023 general elections. Although that electoral cycle had formally ended, its controversies continued to shape public perception, judicial outcomes, and political discourse.
Rather than a year marked by electoral triumphs, 2025 became a period of introspection, damage control, and cautious reform as the Commission sought to recalibrate its systems ahead of the 2027 general elections.
Under the leadership of Prof. Mahmood Yakubu, INEC presented 2025 as a consolidation year, one focused on institutional learning, technological refinement, and sustained stakeholder engagement.
Beneath this reform narrative, however, lay persistent questions about credibility, enforcement capacity, and institutional independence. These unresolved issues framed public debate around the Commission’s performance throughout the year.
Although 2025 was not a general election year, INEC remained actively engaged in off-cycle governorship elections, by-elections, reruns, and court-ordered supplementary polls. These contests provided a practical test of whether lessons from previous electoral failures had been internalised.
Administratively, the Commission recorded modest improvements. Logistics deployment was generally better coordinated, election materials arrived earlier in many locations, and communication between national headquarters and state offices showed signs of improvement. In several off-cycle elections, voter accreditation processes were smoother, and polling units opened more promptly than in previous years. Yet these gains proved uneven and fragile.
Reports of voter intimidation, vote trading, ballot snatching, and disruptions at polling units persisted in several locations. While INEC often attributed these incidents to security lapses beyond its direct control, critics argued that the Commission’s largely passive posture toward electoral malpractice continued to embolden political actors. More troubling was the recurring pattern of post-election litigation.
Many contests conducted in 2025 ultimately shifted from polling units to courtrooms, reinforcing the perception that elections in Nigeria are merely the opening phase of prolonged legal battles. INEC’s role as an election manager, rather than a guarantor of electoral integrity, remained a central point of criticism. The Commission’s relationship with the judiciary was particularly defining in 2025.
INEC repeatedly emphasised its commitment to obeying court orders, especially in pre-election disputes involving party primaries and candidate nominations. In practice, this resulted in last-minute substitutions, reinstatements, and disqualifications, sometimes implemented within days or even hours of elections.
While this strict legal compliance reinforced INEC’s image as a law-abiding institution, it also exposed its limited authority within Nigeria’s electoral architecture. Conflicting judgments from courts of coordinate jurisdiction frequently placed the Commission in difficult positions, attracting criticism regardless of which ruling it obeyed. INEC’s calls for clearer timelines for pre-election litigation and greater judicial discipline reflected deeper institutional frustration.
Although it administers elections, it does not control the legal environment that increasingly determines electoral outcomes, a reality that in 2025 continued to weaken operational certainty.
Technology remained central to INEC’s reform narrative throughout the year.
Following widespread controversy over the performance of the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) and the INEC Result Viewing Portal (IReV) during the 2023 elections, the Commission focused on optimisation rather than replacement. Internal audits and system upgrades were undertaken, while training for ad-hoc staff was expanded.
In elections conducted during the year, BVAS performed relatively well for voter accreditation, reducing incidents of multiple voting and impersonation. However, the credibility gap surrounding result transmission persisted. Public confidence in real-time uploads remained low, shaped by memories of delayed or failed transmissions in previous elections. INEC’s explanations, often centred on connectivity challenges, were technically plausible but politically insufficient, leaving trust slower to recover than the technology itself.
Voter registration also featured prominently in INEC’s preparations for 2027. The Commission sustained its Continuous Voter Registration programme throughout the year, maintaining online pre-registration platforms and keeping physical registration centres operational in many states. Emphasis was placed on youth participation, first-time voters, persons with disabilities, and internally displaced persons, supported by expanded civic education campaigns in collaboration with civil society organisations and the media.
Despite these efforts, structural bottlenecks persisted. Funding limitations, uneven deployment of equipment, and staffing shortages slowed registration in several areas.
In rural and conflict-affected communities, access to registration centres remained limited, raising concerns about potential disenfranchisement. While INEC projected optimism about meeting voter registration targets ahead of 2027, 2025 exposed the gap between policy intention and operational capacity. Stakeholder engagement intensified during the year, with regular meetings held with political parties through the Inter-Party Advisory Council, consultations with civil society groups, and frequent media briefings.
These platforms facilitated dialogue on campaign finance, election security, and compliance with codes of conduct. However, critics argued that dialogue without deterrence had limited impact. Political parties continued to violate campaign finance regulations, engage in vote buying, and deploy thugs, often with minimal consequences.
INEC’s repeated warnings against electoral malpractice were rarely matched by decisive sanctions. In the absence of an Electoral Offences Commission, deterrence remained weak, leaving the Commission reliant on moral persuasion rather than institutional authority.
Questions around institutional independence also persisted. While constitutionally autonomous, INEC continued to grapple with delayed funding releases, political pressure, and reliance on security agencies during elections. Internally, the Commission strengthened its code of conduct and disciplinary processes, but public accountability remained limited. Allegations of compromised ad-hoc staff surfaced periodically, yet few cases resulted in visible or high-profile sanctions.
INEC’s repeated advocacy for constitutional and legal reforms to strengthen its autonomy underscored a structural reality: the Commission cannot fully deliver credible elections within an ecosystem that tolerates impunity and political interference.
Ultimately, INEC’s performance in 2025 was defined less by dramatic success or failure than by unresolved contradictions. The Commission demonstrated administrative learning, improved logistics, and greater openness to stakeholder engagement.
Yet fundamental challenges, public trust, enforcement capacity, and institutional independence, remained largely intact. As Nigeria edges closer to the 2027 general elections, 2025 stands as a cautionary year. Reform rhetoric alone will not restore confidence in the electoral process.
Without stronger enforcement mechanisms, clearer legal frameworks, and demonstrable accountability, INEC risks entering another election cycle burdened by the same credibility questions it seeks to escape.
The true test of INEC’s 2025 recalibration will not be found in policy documents or stakeholder meetings, but in whether Nigerians can once again believe that their votes will count, and be seen to count.