By Abdul Mahmud
Democracy cannot survive on the periodic ritual of elections alone while the spaces in which citizens organise, deliberate and contest political power become increasingly difficult to access. The public sphere is the lifeblood of democratic society, providing citizens with opportunities to scrutinise power, challenge official narratives and pose political alternatives. The reports of opposition parties encountering difficulties securing venues for conventions, rallies and town hall meetings in Nigeria raise a fundamental question about the condition of this sphere: can political competition remain meaningful when access to the spaces in which it takes place is obstructed?
To help answer this question, we turn to Jürgen Habermas and the compelling insights of his theoretical framework.
In The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, he conceptualises the public space, or what he calls the public sphere, as an arena in which private individuals come together to discuss matters of common concern and subject the exercise of political power and authority to critical examination. For him, the democratic value of the public space lies not only in the possibility of rational debate, but also as a site where arguments are assessed on their merits rather than accepted or rejected because of the institutional power behind them. The public sphere is not the property of government, political parties, or those who control public facilities; it is the very condition of democratic life sustained by the freedom to assemble, communicate, and challenge authority.
The Nigerian experience raises concerns about the practical conditions necessary for the flourish of this freedom. In April 2026, the African Democratic Congress (ADC) complained that it encountered difficulties securing the Eagle Square and the velodrome at the Moshood Abiola Stadium in Abuja for its national convention.
The party eventually moved its convention to Rainbow Event Centre. The FCT Minister, Ezenwo Nyesom Wike, disputed the allegation that the authorities had denied the party access to Eagle Square, maintaining that the appropriate application procedure had not been followed. The competing accounts illustrate the need for transparent procedures governing access to public facilities, particularly when political parties seek to exercise their constitutional rights. A further controversy arose in May when police barricaded access roads to A-Class Event Centre in Abuja, where a faction of the Peoples Democratic Party planned to hold a convention.
The incident followed a warning by the FCT Administration to hotels and event centres concerning their hosting of political parties whose status was disputed. The party faction maintained that it had paid for the venue and notified security agencies. The episode raised questions about the relationship between administrative decisions, political association and the right to assemble peacefully. Disputes concerning party recognition can be justifiably addressed by the courts, but the restrictions imposed on political gatherings must have a clear legal foundation that’s open to scrutiny.
The concerns have not been confined to Abuja. In October, the Nigeria Democratic Congress alleged that its preparations for political activities were frustrated by difficulties securing venues and billboards. The party claimed that an event venue became unavailable after payment was made, while the All Progressives Congress rejected the allegations. Last week, the controversy in Enugu added another dimension. Organisers of a town hall meeting scheduled for 29 October at Amadeo Event Centre, with Peter Obi expected to attend, alleged that security operatives were preventing preparations for the event just as the owners of the Event Centre cancelled the party’s booking. The Obidient Movement accused the Enugu State Government orchestrating the cancellation.
The distinction between an allegation and a proven act of interference is essential, but so is the obligation to investigate credible claims that political activities are being obstructed. These incidents, though not proofs of an orchestrated policy to suppress opposition politics, warrant examination as a series of disputes concerning access to the physical spaces through which political participation is organised. Democracy cannot protect freedom of assembly where its practical exercise depends on opaque administrative discretions or unexplained interventions by security agencies.
Habermas’s theory illuminates the relationship between the physical and communicative dimensions of public life. A public space requires more than the formal freedom to express opinions. Here lies the importance: citizens must have meaningful opportunities to advance competing arguments, organise collective action and bring their concerns into public debate. A political party that is legally entitled to hold a meeting but cannot secure a venue without arbitrary interference may possess a formal right whose practical exercise has been impaired.
The exercise of these rights does not exist at the sufferance of political power. Any restriction on their enjoyment must derive from law, serve a constitutionally legitimate purpose and satisfy the requirements of necessity, proportionality and non-discrimination. Public order and the regulation of public facilities cannot become convenient grounds for arbitrary interference with constitutionally guaranteed freedoms.
The public space is also important because it provides the means of holding political authority accountable between elections. Political conventions enable parties to organise; rallies allow them to communicate their programmes; town hall meetings create opportunities for direct engagement between political figures and citizens. Such activities are not peripheral entertainments attached to electoral competition.
They are among the mechanisms through which citizens evaluate public claims, develop political judgments and decide what kind of government they want. Citizens’ evaluation is hamstrung by the deliberate policy that shrinks the public space and makes it contingent on the ability of the political party shut out of it to produce evidence of its own exclusion, as the ruling party often argues. To accept such a requirement is to reverse the burden of responsibility of the ruling party and place an additional obstacle before those whose freedoms of association and peaceful assembly are already under threat.
The right to participate in public life is not a privilege to be negotiated with venue managers or a concession to be granted by public authorities. Where access to public spaces for political activities is obstructed, the primary obligation rests on the institutions responsible for safeguarding democratic freedoms to explain and justify their actions. To require the excluded to prove the exclusion before their complaint can be taken seriously risks normalising the very restrictions that democratic institutions exist to prevent.The openness of Nigeria’s public space is a measure of the space democracy affords political disagreement. Government has no obligation to agree with the opposition, and political parties remain subject to lawful regulation. The obligation is to preserve the conditions in which competing positions can be expressed and judged by citizens.
The public space is not simply a setting for democratic activity; its openness is a precondition for meaningful political participation. Restrictions on access to that space injure more than the party denied a venue. They also deprive citizens of the opportunity to hear competing arguments, question those who seek their votes and make informed judgements about their political alternatives. On this point, as on so many others, Habermas is right: democracy cannot flourish where the public space is closed to contestation, dissent and the free exchange of ideas.